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Dr David Oswell 
Department of Sociology, Goldsmiths, University of London 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the question of the empirical in the context of its related 
notion of experience, inasmuch as the latter explicitly brings into play issues 
about subjectivity. The paper focuses directly on the ideas of the Italian 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben concerning infancy and experience, voice and 
speech, and bare life and politics. In doing so, an argument is made that 
questions Agamben’s recourse to a particular form of linguistic model and 
makes evident the limitations that such a model poses for an understanding of 
significant transformations in modern forms of sovereignty regarding the 
socio-political articulation of highly domesticated voices. The paper intends to 
provide some sociological and social theoretical ground for a consideration of 
the voice of infancy in contemporary forms of biopolitical sovereignty. In doing 
so, the paper suggests that infancy is more than a figuration of 
experimentation, inasmuch as its voice (hovering between babble and the 
comprehensible) may resonate across an empirical domain, which is 
reconfigured through such a voice (or voices) heard, taken seriously and 
touching others. 
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Infancy and Experience: Voice, Politics, and Bare Life 
Introduction 
The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, in his Homo Sacer: Sovereign 
Power and Bare Life (1998), presents the following image of a ‘secret 
solidarity’ between international humanitarian organisations and sovereign 
state power: 
It takes only a glance at the recent publicity campaigns to gather funds 
for refugees from Rwanda to realize that here human life is exclusively 
considered... as sacred life – which is to say, as life that can be killed 
but not sacrificed – and that only as such is it made into the object of 
aid and protection. The ‘imploring eyes’ of the Rwandan child, whose 
photograph is shown to obtain money but who ‘is now becoming more 
and more difficult to find alive,’ may well be the most telling 
contemporary cipher of the bare life that humanitarian organizations, in 
perfect symmetry with state power, need. (1998:133-4) 
 
Although, for Agamben, this image leads to his commenting on the 
contemporary status of ‘the refugee’ in the context of international human 
rights and transformations in national sovereignty, for me in this paper it is 
Agamben’s invocation of the infant (the child, literally unable to speak, here 
subtracted by the photographic image, and reduced to a demand to be looked 
at) that is the significant point of focus. In Homo Sacer, which I shall discuss 
more later in the essay, Agamben talks about the failure to heal the gap 
between zoe (simple life) and bios (a way of life) and between voice (phōnē) 
and speech (logos). He argues that: ‘Bare life remains included in politics in 
the form of the exception, that is, as something that is included solely through 
an exclusion’ (ibid: 11). To phrase it simply here, the Rwandan child, as 
muted bare life, is included within the geo-politics of humanitarian aid, 
regional development and human rights intervention, only inasmuch as it is 
excluded absolutely from that sphere of influence. The presence of the 
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Rwandan child – as an absent presence in the image as symbolic 
representation – is indicative of the configuration of biopolitical power as a 
form of sovereignty. Although much discussion of Agamben’s ideas in this 
respect has been almost exclusively limited to the sphere of the nation-state 
and the  geo-political, we might wonder, with respect to the child, what 
corresponding reconfigurations have been taking place at the level of the 
domestic and the family. If the infantilised child is so easily figured as ‘bare 
life’, to what extent is this figuration a consequence of their lack of political 
speech? To what extent is the child denied the ability to make claims about 
the empirical world? To what extent is their inability to speak and to lay claim 
to their experience linked, not only to their relation to linguistic or political 
practice, but to our conceptualisation of language and politics? And to what 
extent is this complex of ‘domestic’ issues (a reconfiguration of the familiar 
and the family) tied to those national and geo-political issues about 
sovereignty and state power? 
 
For Agamben the problematic of bare life and the logic of the exception is 
intimately tied to ‘the idea of an inner solidarity between democracy and 
totalitarianism’ (ibid: 10) and to the fact that ‘this idea alone will make it 
possible to clear the way for the new politics, which remains largely to be 
invented’ (ibid: 10-11). Notwithstanding the hubris of resting such monumental 
change on a single idea, my paper engages with the political ideas of 
Agamben with respect to a series of questions about political voice, 
experience and the biopolitical. I argue that: a) the formulation above, 
regarding bare life and the form of the exception, is linked to Agamben’s 
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earlier work, from 1978, on infancy, such that infancy is figured as ‘the 
transcendental experience of the difference between language and speech, 
which first opens the space of history’ (2007: 60); b) if we are to surpass the 
stale ground that Agamben re-presents and hopes to move beyond, then a 
rethinking of the relation between infancy, experience and political voice is 
necessary; c) the structural model of language hinders an understanding of 
infant speech that might be mobilised as politically transformative; and, d) the 
Aristotelian distinctions between voice/speech and household/state (which are 
central to Agamben’s formulation of biopolitical sovereignty) do not properly 
stand up to the weight of contemporary sociological knowledge and demand 
to be rethought in that sociological and social theoretical context.  
 
For Agamben, there is an intimate connection between experience and 
experimentation. In that sense, he works in the context of the longstanding 
and etymological linkage from ‘empirical’ to ‘experience’ (the one ancient 
Greek, the other roughly its Latin translation) mediated by the term 
‘experiment’. In modern social thought the empirical tends to refer to that 
which is observed, whereas experience tends to refer to that subjective 
process of observing or to the subjective relationality to an external (in a very 
broad sense) world. Experimentation is the process through which experience 
of an observed world can be transformed into knowledge. Hence the 
significance of trial and error in an understanding of modern science. For 
modern science, Agamben argues, experimentation is a methodologically 
disciplined form of experience. Of course, a significant aspect of modern 
philosophical thought has concerned the epistemological question as to 
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whether knowledge of the world must be only through experience (i.e. 
empiricism) or whether it is possible to construct knowledge through a priori 
concepts. This genealogy of modern philosophy, and Kant’s role within it, 
plays a significant subtext for Agamben’s writing on infancy and experience. 
For Agamben then, (who elaborates and deconstructs a version of this 
narrative), ‘experience’ (as that which might name a ‘subjective’, simple and 
pure, relation to the empirical) is problematised through an understanding of 
the constitution of the subject in language. And yet, as we will see, experience 
is not only mediated by language, but the fact of such mediation posits infancy 
as that which stands before language. Infancy becomes, for Agamben, the 
primary figuration of the empirical. For Agamben then, there is a problem with 
positing experience of an empirical world as if such experience were existent 
prior to language. Infancy provides a way of understanding experience in the 
context of a linguistic constitution of the subject. In Agamben’s writing, though, 
infancy is somewhat ambivalent, both a synonym for experimentation and yet 
also referring to the infant as that upon which language is acquired. It is this 
ambivalence that is also played out in his later work on biopolitical 
sovereignty. Notably, Agamben’s understanding of bare life (which is, I argue, 
in many ways a synonym for infancy) provides an equivalent ambivalence (as 
it were, both relation and substance). 
 
Thus, for me in this paper, the question of the infant voice is one that opens 
up the issue of the empirical by refiguring infancy not as passive, but as the 
active articulator of experience and the empirical. I turn to contemporary 
sociological research (as a provocation, rather than as something which is 
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simply a posteriori) that might support and nurture such an infant voice. That 
in itself raises significant questions about the epistemological status of 
sociological as against philosophical knowledge. Nevertheless, whereas 
Agamben steadfastly construes a solidarity across democratic and totalitarian 
political systems and an antinomy, almost, between bare life (zoe) and a form 
of life (bios), on the one hand, and voice (phone) and political speech (logos), 
on the other, as constituted at a ‘historico-philosophical level’, we will 
endeavour to hold these ideas to sociological thought and social theory, not 
least in the context of research on infancy, experience and voice. In the paper 
I initially discuss Agamben’s writing on infancy and experience. I locate this 
work in the context of the semiology of Saussure and the development of 
semantics by Benveniste and suggest a rethinking of Agamben’s structural 
linguistic model. I then turn to Agamben’s discussion of political voice and 
bare life and discuss the reiteration of this structural linguistic model. Finally, I 
look to contemporary sociological research on children’s voice in the context 
of questions about the ‘democratisation of the family’ in order to suggest a 
rethinking of Agamben’s thoughts on sovereignty and political voice. 
 
Infancy and Experience  
Agamben, in ‘Infancy and History: An Essay on the Destruction of Experience’ 
(originally published in 1978), provides a historico-philosophical engagement 
with formulations of the relationship between experience and subjectivity 
primarily from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. Central to his argument is 
an understanding of infancy as a condition of possibility for the human 
linguistic subject and for the articulation of experience within and by that 
 7
subject. Thus, for example, his discussion of the Symbolist poets does not 
simply repeat an understanding of the child’s infancy inasmuch as its fresh-
faced interaction with the world provides the promise of novel interpretation, 
clarity, and criticism.1 Rather, he argues that ‘modern poetry from Baudelaire 
onwards is seen to be founded not on new experience, but on an 
unprecedented lack of experience’ (Agamben, 2007: 47). Experience, 
Agamben argues with regard to Baudelaire, is that which might protect us 
from surprise, whereas ‘the production of shock always implies a gap in 
experience’ (ibid.: 47).2 For Baudelaire, then, seeing the world as a child 
implies the expropriation of experience (i.e. the taking away of experience as 
if it were a property). Agamben argues that: ‘[p]oetry responds to the 
expropriation of experience by converting this expropriation into a reason for 
surviving and making the inexperiencible its normal condition’. But, he argues, 
this does not imply that the ‘new’ is a ‘new object of experience’, only a 
‘suspension of experience’ (ibid.: 47). For Baudelaire, Agamben argues, the 
expropriation of experience is figured with the finding of a ‘common place’ and 
with the ‘destruction of experience’ therein. Agamben states that: 
‘[e]strangement, which removes from the most commonplace objects their 
power to be experienced, thus becomes the exemplary procedure of a poetic 
project which aims to make of the Inexperiencible the new “lieu commun”, 
humanity’s new experience’ (ibid.: 48). This common place, paradoxically the 
space of a new human experience, is, then, one figured through the imagery 
of infancy, a condition predicated on an originary engagement with objects 
and a fundamental lack of experience. 
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However, it is not until the end of the third chapter that Agamben refers 
directly to infancy and he does so in the context of discussion of Husserl’s 
comment, in Cartesian Meditations, about ‘pure’ and ‘mute experience’ being 
‘made to utter’ the Cartesian ego cogito (quoted in ibid.: 42). For Agamben it 
is significant that Husserl both presents the cogito here as a linguistic 
expression and that he does so in terms of a transition from mute to voiced, 
pure experience to subjectivity. Agamben says: 
A theory of experience truly intended to posit the problem of origin in a 
radical way would then have to start beyond this ‘first expression’ with 
experience as ‘still mute so to speak’ – that is, it would have to ask: 
does a mute experience exist, does an infancy [in-fancy] of experience 
exist? And if so, what is its relationship to language? (ibid.: 42) 
 
In the fourth and final chapter, drawing initially on Johann Georg Hamann’s 
eighteenth century critique of Kant (Metakritik über den Purismum der 
Vernunft) (see Alexander, 1966), Agamben is able to be critical of the 
mathematical and geometric model of the ego that has survived from 
Descartes, to locate transcendental subjectivity within language, and yet also 
to problematise any collapse of the transcendental and the linguistic (ibid.: 50-
1). He argues that ‘it is in language that the subject has its site and origin, and 
that only in and through language is it possible to shape transcendental 
apperception as an “I think”’ (ibid.: 51).  
 
It is through the work of the French linguist Émile Benveniste, though, that 
Agamben properly develops his ideas about infancy, experience and the 
transcendental. ‘Subjectivity’, he says, ‘is nothing other than the speaker’s 
capacity to posit him or herself as an ego, and cannot in any way be defined 
through some wordless sense of being oneself, nor by deferral to some 
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ineffable psychic experience of the ego, but only through a linguistic I 
transcending any possible experience’ (ibid.: 52). The particularity of the 
pronoun ‘I’, Benveniste argues, cannot be defined with reference to a concept 
of ‘I’ nor with reference to the ownership of that pronoun by a particular 
person speaking (in the sense that that pronoun may be used by any person) 
(Benveniste, 1966). Agamben argues that: 
Only on this basis does it become possible to pose the question of 
experience in unequivocal terms. For if the subject is merely the 
enunciator, contrary to what Husserl believed, we shall never attain in 
the subject the original status of experience: ‘pure, and thereby still 
mute experience’. On the contrary, the constitution of the subject in and 
through language is precisely the expropriation of this “wordless” 
experience; from the outset, it is always “speech”. A primary 
experience, far from being subjective, could then only be what in 
human beings comes before the subject – that is, before language: a 
“wordless” experience in the literal sense of the term, a human infancy, 
whose boundary would be marked by language. (Agamben, 2007: 54).  
 
The mythical circle in which infancy and language explain the origins of each 
other provides for Agamben, not an impasse, but the possibility of explanation 
of both infancy and experience. In contrast to accounts that understand 
infancy as developmental (i.e. in psychological terms, as that which occurs in 
linear time before language acquisition) or as phylogenetic (as a stage of 
human history and organisation in the path from primitive to civilised), infancy, 
for Agamben, is between nature and culture. Infancy is not ‘something which 
chronologically precedes language’ (ibid.: 55). Agamben reinterprets the 
classical understanding of man as the animal that speaks. He argues that: 
‘[a]nimals do not enter language, they are already inside it’. In contrast, he 
states that: ‘[m]an, instead, by having an infancy, by preceding speech, splits 
this single language and, in order to speak, has to constitute himself as the 
subject of language – he has to say I’ (ibid.: 59). The constitution of the 
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subject in language presumes a splitting between language as system and 
speech as parole (or, in Benveniste’s terms, between the semiotic and the 
semantic), between the voice of nature and the speech of social organisation. 
Agamben declares: 
It is the fact of man’s infancy (in other words, in order to speak, he 
need to be constituted as a subject within language by removing 
himself from infancy) which breaks the closed world of the sign and 
transforms pure language into human discourse, the semiotic into the 
semantic. Because of his infancy, because he does not speak from the 
very start, man cannot enter into language as a system of signs without 
radically transforming it, without constituting it in discourse. (ibid.: 63) 
 
The human is the ‘animal deprived of language and obliged, therefore, to 
receive it from outside himself’ (ibid.: 65); language, in this sense, always has 
a relation of exteriority to human subjectivity. 
 
The splitting between language and discourse (between the semiotic and the 
semantic) for Agamben, introduces the possibility of human history and 
experience. Animals reside in a world of semiotic signals, whereas humans 
inhabit a realm of interpretation and dialogue. Agamben reads Benveniste 
such that animals are trapped within a domain of the semiotic, a pure system 
of language; in contrast, humans, because they learn a language and 
because they come to inhabit a language after their birth, constitute a splitting 
between an abstracted semiotic system (for Saussure, langue) and a 
semantic world of speech and dialogue (for Saussure, parole) (see 
Benveniste, 1966 and 1974).3 These two domains, the semiotic and the 
semantic, though, for Benveniste, are distinct and incommunicable; as 
Agamben, quoting Benveniste, says ‘A moat separates them’ (Agamben, 
2007: 63); they are ‘two transcendental limits which define and simultaneously 
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are defined by man’s infancy’ (ibid: 63-4). For Benveniste, the translation of a 
semiotic order from one language to another (i.e. from one national linguistic 
system to another) is impossible; and yet, it is certainly possible to translate 
the semantics from one language to another (see Benveniste, 1966). For 
Agamben, a semiotic order – an order in which the animal resides – is defined 
as a natural order, ‘the pure pre-babble of nature’ (ibid.: 64). Moreover, he 
argues that ‘[t]he semantic does not exist except in its momentary emergence 
from the semiotic in the instance of discourse, whose elements once uttered, 
fall back into pure language, which reassembles them in its mute dictionary of 
signs’ (ibid.: 64). Agamben asserts that the ‘phoneme’ (following Roman 
Jacobson’s analysis) enables ‘the passage from the semiotic to the semantic’, 
from signs to words, as Benveniste would say (ibid.: 67). Phonemes, for 
Agamben, reside in ‘the correspondence-difference (in the chōra, as Plato 
would have said)’ (ibid.: 67). It is because human beings do not have 
language from the start of their life, Agamben argues, that when they come to 
speak (when they enter into language from the outside, but with the 
propensity to do so from the inside) they transform language such that it 
becomes also discourse (in Benveniste’s sense), dialogue, and interpretation. 
The splitting of language by virtue of the fact of infancy is compensated by the 
passage of phonemes (sound images, but also sound objects), such that the 
two sides of the split are able to resonate in harmony (ibid.: 66). Agamben 
turns finally in the essay to the image of the mouth (open and closed), rather 
than the moat, as that space through which articulation is possible (ibid.: 70). 
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In the ‘Preface’ to this work (written in 1988), Agamben talks about a book not 
yet written, a book on ‘The Human Voice’. He asks whether there is a 
singularity to the human voice (‘as the chirp is the voice of the cricket or the 
bray is the voice of the donkey’), whether that voice is linguistic, whether 
human being is defined through a relation to language, and what the nature of 
the relationship is between voice (phōnē) and speech (or language) (logos) 
(2007: 4). His discussion of these questions lead him, as we have seen, to 
understand the singularity of language not as signifying something ineffable, 
but ‘as something superlatively sayable: the thing of language’ (ibid.: 4), the 
‘pure fact that one speaks’ (ibid.: 6). The experience of language (defined as 
an experimentum linguae) is defined through the figure of infancy: ‘[i]nfancy is 
an experimentum linguae of this kind, in which the limits of language are to be 
found not outside language, in the direction of the referent, but in an 
experience of language as such, in its pure self-reference’ (ibid.: 6). The 
Kantian transcendental is understood not with reference to pure reason as 
such, but only inasmuch as that reason is an experimentum linguae. 
Moreover, what is experienced in the experimentum linguae is not ‘an 
impossibility of saying’, but ‘an impossibility of speaking from the basis of a 
language’ (ibid.: 8). But whereas in his earlier essay the gap between voice 
and speech, animal and human, semiotic and semantic, language and 
discourse was able to be translated through the capacity of the phoneme to 
travel from one to the other, to make possible a mutual resonance, in this 
‘Preface’ the distance between the two sides is not able to be sutured. The 
two sides of the binary are not able to be articulated; there is only an empty 
space or limit; and yet it is that emptiness that constitutes, for Agamben, the 
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possibility of an ethics. Moreover, he says, in this context, this empty space is 
a consequence of man finding himself in language without a voice (ibid.: 9-
11).  
 
Problems with Agamben’s Linguistic Model 
Agamben’s re-location of the transcendental within language and his 
understanding of infancy as that which provides a transcendental experience 
of the difference between language and discourse, or between the semiotic 
and the semantic, needs to be questioned with respect to the form of 
Agamben’s linguistic model and to the assignment of language to human 
infants. Agamben’s linguistic model is derived in parts from Saussure and 
from Benveniste.4 I will focus primarily on the latter. For Benveniste the 
human condition is essentially defined by a faculty of symbolisation (and in 
that respect he comes out of a well-established philosophical and social 
scientific tradition, see for example Vandenberghe, 2001). The symbol makes 
possible the formation of a concept with respect to a concrete object; it makes 
possible representation, abstract thought, and knowledge (Benveniste, 1996: 
26). In contrast, animals do not find themselves in a world of symbols, but in a 
world of signals. Animals are able to communicate with each other, but only 
inasmuch as that communication is not open to abstraction or interpretation. 
Whereas humans are able to invent, use and interpret signs, animals are only 
able to communicate sensory experience. Animals are able to express their 
emotions; humans are able to name them (Benveniste, 1996: 27). Moreover, 
whereas humans have culture, which Benveniste understands (following Levi-
Strauss) in the context of prohibition, animals do not (Benveniste, 1996: 30).5  
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Agamben readily accepts this understanding of language as primarily 
symbolic, but he also interprets Benveniste’s distinction between the form of 
language and its function – namely, the distinction between language and 
discourse, or between the semiotic and the semantic – in the context of a 
fundamental metaphysical division between the human and the animal. 
Benveniste, though, is adamant that animals do not have a language as such; 
bees, for example, do not have the capacity to formulate and interpret a sign 
(1966: 60). But for Agamben, the ego cogito is transposed onto the field of 
language (to be expressed as a linguistic expression), not because human 
language is a priori distinct from animal language, but rather only inasmuch as 
animals only live within one form of language (the semiotic), whereas humans 
(as a consequence of human infancy) live with the two sides of language, 
both its form and its function (both the semiotic and semantic). And yet (over-
and-above any question as to whether Benveniste’s writings actually facilitate 
such a reading) in this formulation by Agamben the semiotic as ‘the pure pre-
babble of nature’ – as that which is shared with the animal – loses its 
animality, its physicality in the moment of its becoming human, in the moment 
of its non-articulation with the semantic.6 In Agamben’s discussion, the notion 
of a ‘pure language’ (the semiotic) is asked to do too much work. On the one 
hand, it refers to something comparable to Saussure’s notion of linguistic 
system (langue) and to Benveniste’s understanding of the correlation of 
linguistic system and society; and yet, on the other, inasmuch as it is applied 
to animals, it is seen as akin to the indivisible cry of nature. 
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This issue raises the important question, if we take Agamben partly at his 
word but against his intent, as to whether the ‘thing of language’ should be 
read more in terms of its physicality than its symbolics. If the phoneme is able 
to offer a moment of resonance between the semiotic and the semantic, the 
signal and the symbol, the natural and the cultural, as Agamben argues, then 
it must be on account of its ability to touch both orders, but also on account of 
it being of both orders; Agamben says that there must be ‘a mediating 
element which enables the two systems to resonate’ (2007: 66). It is important 
for Agamben that this mediating element does not fix the two systems (in the 
sense of locking them into place, into a static existence) and, in that sense, 
any mediation is subject to a fundamental contingency. Agamben foregrounds 
the importance of considering the ontology of this mediating element, which 
he then discusses in terms of its topology as a ‘historico-transcendental 
region’, namely infancy (ibid.: 67). The phoneme is both a-signifying and 
signifying; as semiotic it is ‘recognised’ and as semantic it is ‘comprehended’. 
In the passage across the two orders, the mediating element, the phoneme, 
itself must transform (as it were from sound object to sound image), such that 
phoneme (as sound image) within the order of discourse (semantics, parole) 
is properly symbolic and yet holds in the phoneme-as-symbol (as it were) the 
resonance of the sound object.7  
 
Such an understanding of the ‘thing of language’ (and there is a question as 
to whether the phoneme is an adequate concept for understanding such a 
thing) might be illuminated with reference to the work of the American 
pragmatist philosopher Peirce, with respect to the notion of indexical relations 
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and their differentiation from the symbolic relations: namely, indexical 
relations are constituted by virtue of a relation of contiguity or connection, 
whereas symbolic relations are constituted by virtue of a conventional and 
abstracted relationality (Peirce, 1998: 4-10). Whereas for the index, the sign is 
physically connected to the object (as when the wind blows a weather cock), 
for the symbol, the sign, in order to represent an object, can only do so in the 
absence of that object. Thus, indices constitute relations in praesentia and 
symbols in absentia. Returning to Agamben, then, the phoneme-as-
mediating-element is understood in the context of both Saussure and 
Benveniste as symbolic, in the sense that that which is represented is an 
absent presence. The object is substituted by the symbol, or in this case the 
phoneme-as-sound-object (that which resides in the pure pre-babble of 
nature) is substituted by the phoneme-as-sound-image. Inasmuch as the 
object still resides in the symbol, it does so only as that which is substituted 
(in its most Derridean form as a trace). In contrast, then, we might wonder 
that, had Agamben looked to Peirce’s understanding of indexical relationality 
instead, then the question of the ontology of mediation might have been left 
open as a contingent socio-historical question, rather than being closed down 
as ‘historico-transcendental’, as a condition of possibility in the Kantian sense. 
In this sense, a relation in praesentia is not defined a priori by an abstraction, 
but only by virtue of the actual elements present and contiguously connected. 
 
Equally, although Foucault, in his The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), 
foregrounds ‘discursive formation’, discourse is that which is able to mediate 
between ‘words’ and ‘things’. Moreover, his understanding of a discursive 
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formation is such that it understands that formation in terms of the contingent 
collection of statements, in terms, that is, not of linguistic structure (langue) as 
the condition of possibility for particular speech acts, but of the conditions of 
existence of the particular formation of statements (Foucault, 1972). For us 
here, if we accept the centrality of infancy to an understanding of language 
and experience, then this would imply a re-conceptualisation of the relation 
between infancy and experience not as a transcendental, but through the 
particular contiguously formed conditions of existence of this coupling. The 
fact of history, in this reformulation, would certainly be removed from this 
equation as an internal consequence and made to act both internally and 
externally.  
 
Opening the question of infancy to socio-historical contingency would 
undoubtedly imply a demand not simply to be critical of an a priori division 
between the human and animal (inasmuch as the animal is both external to 
the human and the infant-animal within), but to consider the apparatuses 
through which specific formations of language are distributed across humans. 
Thus, there would be a demand to understand infancy within, for example, the 
emergence and growth of a literary culture (both commercial and pedagogic) 
for children from the seventeenth century onward and the institutionalisation 
of governmental regimes concerning literacy in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. The historical ascription of language to children, or the distribution 
of language across both adults and children, exposes the lie that language is 
a right of birth. The history and sociology of childhood provide one such site 
from which we can see how that which has been seen as animal and akin to 
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animal (inasmuch as the infant has been seen as pre-human and pre-social) 
might be ascribed both language and subjectivity and also importantly how 
such a subjectivity has been construed as experiential. In that sense, if we 
read Agamben sociologically – and such that ‘language’ is not a social 
universal, but a historically and socially specific array of practices and 
technologies (Hunter, 1984) – then ‘infancy’ may provide the transcendental 
experience of the relation between language and discourse, voice and 
speech, but only inasmuch as that position is akin to Foucault’s historical a 
priori (Foucault, 1972). 
 
Politics and Voice 
Agamben returns, in Homo Sacer (written in 1995), to Aristotle’s distinction, in 
The Politics, between voice (phōnē) and speech (logos) – such that although 
all animals have the capacity to voice pain and pleasure, only humans 
through speech can discuss ethics and justice and, moreover, through speech 
a political community can be formed in the city.8 But, in this later work, 
Agamben particularly focuses on Aristotle’s discussion of the relation between 
voice and the organisation of speech, on the one hand, and a division 
between the household (oikos) and the state (polis), on the other, in order to 
formulate a relation between metaphysics and politics (1998: 7). Aristotle is 
concerned with differentiating between the household and the state not in 
terms of scale (as if the state were organised similarly to the household, but 
only on a larger size), but qualitatively in terms of the form of governance 
required for each social association. For Aristotle, the management of the 
household is qualitatively different to the government of a state; the authority 
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over women, children and slaves is different to that over citizens; and the 
father or the despot is of a different kind to the statesman. Unlike women, 
children and slaves, citizens are free men and government over them requires 
a different kind of authority (1278b30-39). The household is governed by 
necessity and reproduction (1252a24-33). The state is the telos of those 
earlier associations; ‘while it [the city-state, the polis] comes into existence for 
the sake of life [zēn], it exists for the good life [eu zēn]’ (1252b30). The state is 
the composition of those earlier associations, the whole as against the parts 
(1253a19-25). The state is governed ‘on the principle of equality and of 
similarity between the citizens’ (1279a9-10). For Aristotle, then, it is in man’s 
nature to live collectively in a state (polis). In saying so, it is important to 
distinguish such a form of collective living from that of other gregarious 
animals, such as bees. The collective living of man, as distinct from other 
animals, is such that man has the power of speech; man is able to 
communicate collectively with others like him about the value of particular 
forms of action. Of course, the working of a gendered, anthropological 
machine are audible. 
 
For Agamben this discussion bears specifically on an argument concerning 
the relation between sovereignty and bio-politics in the context of figuring 
homo sacer. It provides a way of differentiating between bare life (zoē) and 
bios, ‘the form of living proper to an individual or a group’ (Agamben, 1998: 1) 
and for identifying the significance of the former as an ‘inclusive exclusion’ 
formative of sovereign power, a form of power that articulates metaphysics 
and politics for the West. For the purpose of our discussion here, Agamben’s 
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figuring of bare life in Homo Sacer mimics his figuring of infancy in the 
‘Preface’ to Infancy and History and his dicussion of infancy in the main essay 
of that volume. In Homo Sacer Agamben proclaims that ‘[t]he question “In 
what way does the living being have language?” corresponds exactly to the 
question “In what way does bare life dwell in the polis?”’ (1993: 8). Agamben 
continues by arguing that: ‘[t]he living being has logos by taking away and 
conserving its own voice in it, even as it dwells in the polis by letting its own 
bare life be excluded, as an exception, within it’ (ibid.: 8). For Agamben, then, 
the relation between voice and speech and between life and polis is the same; 
it is one predicated on substitution, but such that that which is substituted 
maintains a presence in its absence. For Agamben, this substitution provides 
the basis for an understanding of the logic of sovereignty (inasmuch as the 
sovereign stands both inside and outside the law) and for a life within it; for 
Agamben, the analogy between living being with life and with voice and the 
subsequent substitution is understood in terms of the metaphysical 
underpinning of Western politics: ‘There is politics because man is the living 
being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life 
and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an 
inclusive exclusion’ (ibid.: 8).9 The form of the exception, as an inclusive 
exclusion is more than a simple substitution. Although Agamben looks to 
ancient forms of juridical discourse to understand the logic of the exception as 
bare life and as life abandoned or under a ban, he often returns to a structural 
understanding of language as a fundamental point of explanation. Thus, he 
presents the following analogy: 
As the pure form of relation, language (like the sovereign ban) always 
already presupposes itself in the figure of something nonrelational, and 
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it is not possible either to enter into relation or to move out of relation 
with what belongs to the form of relation itself. This means not that the 
nonlinguistic is inaccessible to man but simply that man can never 
reach it in the form of a nonrelational and ineffable presupposition, 
since the nonlinguistic is only ever to be found in language itself. (1998: 
50) 
 
Language, and by structural analogy the law, ‘presupposes the nonlinguistic 
as that with which it must maintain itself in a virtual relation (in the form of a 
langue or, more precisely, a grammatical game, that is, in the form of a 
discourse whose actual denotation is maintained in infinite suspension) so 
that it may later denote it in actual speech’ (ibid: 1998: 20). Equally, then, ‘the 
law presupposes the nonjuridical (for example, mere violence in the form of 
the state of nature) as that with which it maintains itself in a potential relation 
in the state of exception. The sovereign exception (as zone of indistinction 
between nature and right) is the presupposition of the juridical reference in the 
form of its suspension’ (ibid: 20-1, italics in original; see also 2005: 36 and 
39). In no uncertain terms Agamben declares: 
Language is the sovereign who, in a permanent state of exception, 
declares that there is nothing outside language and that language is 
always beyond itself. The particular structure of law has its foundation 
in this presuppositional structure of human language. It expresses the 
bond of inclusive exclusion to which a thing is subject because of the 
fact of being in language, of being named. To speak [dire] is, in his 
sense, always to ‘speak the law’, ius dicere. (ibid: 21) 
 
The virtual relationality of ‘pure language’ and ‘pure law’ is a structural 
relationality that contains within itself, so Agamben argues, the condition of 
possibility for all particular acts of speech and law. Whereas in ‘Infancy and 
History’ it was infancy that provided the figure of inclusive exclusion (that 
provided the non-articulation of the inside and outside of language, the animal 
and the human), in Homo Sacer (and also State of Exception) it is the figure 
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of ‘bare life’. In bare life the structural relation between pure language and 
speech is understood in the context of a discussion of Aristotle’s distinction 
between potential (dynamis) and actual (energeia) and also perhaps of the 
reading of structure that is made by Deleuze in Difference and Repetition 
(1994). But just as with the problem of infancy, we might wonder whether it is 
its construction as a transcendental form (whether Kantian or structural) that 
is itself the problem. How is it possible to surpass the problematic of ‘bare life’ 
if the inclusive exclusion of such a life is a structural necessity? And, thus for 
us, how is it possible to articulate a politics of infant voice? Moreover, if there 
is a structural analogy between language, sovereignty and law, is not politics 
itself reduced to the domain of the national as a necessary a priori imposition? 
The contemporary movement of peoples and languages, just as in the past, 
would suggest a hesitation with respect to such strict correspondences. 
 
Sociological Reflections on Children’s Voice 
In this final section of the paper I raise a fundamental question with framing a 
contemporary analysis of political voice and biopolitical governmentality in the 
context of ancient Greek and Roman thought about household, polity, and 
patriarchal authority. I thus reframe the questions of infant voice in the context 
of contemporary sociological and social theoretical knowledge.10 For 
Agamben, in the context of modern sovereignty, ‘the exception everywhere 
becomes the rule’ and we enter ‘a zone of irreducible indistinction’ (ibid.: 9). 
But we should stress – in terms of our concerns here with infancy and 
children’s organised speech – that in modernity any division between 
household and polity cannot be predicated on a difference between the head 
 23
of the family and the statesman; not simply because of an increasing bio-
power, but also because of the productive indistinction across household and 
state, generationality and sovereignty, infancy and political speech. The 
anomaly that makes possible sovereign power (as the transgression of oikos 
and polis, domus and civitas, in the purview of patria potestas and bare life) is 
one that is fractured precisely as a consequence of a series of productive 
indistinctions that give life to characters emerging out of the household and 
taking with them some of the capacities once closely held by the pater 
familias.11  
 
Contemporary sociology –  in its conceptualisation of the democratisation of 
the family and of children’s rights –  has worked out of the context of classical 
thinking on the relation between the household and the state in fifth century 
BC Athens and the nature of authority and paternal power in Republican and 
Imperial Rome. For example, Ulrich Beck in his paper ‘Democratization of the 
family’ implicitly sites contemporary forms of democratisation in the context of 
a notion of the patria potestas. He says that ‘it remains the fact that children 
are “serfs” by virtue of their birth’, that is despite the political, legal and moral 
framing of such power ‘in the guise of care’  (1997: 161). In contrast, Western 
modernisation – especially in the context of the leading edge of Swedish 
social democratic family policy – has provided children with a series of 
entitlements, not least of which is the child’s claim to a life of their own. Beck 
declares: ‘The right of the child to a life of their own is paramount’ and the 
‘rights of a child to a self-determined life are even enforced against the 
parents if necessary’ (ibid: 162). In such circumstances where the state 
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intervenes in order to facilitate the right of the child to a life of their own the 
distinction between private and public, between oikos and polis, is surpassed; 
this zone of indistinction is discussed by Beck in terms of a ‘deprivatisation of 
privacy’ (ibid: 162). Moreover, Beck argues that moral authority becomes 
individualised, not such that individualisation is an external imposing process, 
but rather such that it is something that young people do to themselves: 
‘”Biographization” of youth means becoming active, struggling and designing 
ones own life. A life of one’s own is becoming an everyday problem for action, 
staging and self-representation’ (ibid: 163). For Beck the categories of young 
people (he mentions ‘youth’, but we should add ‘childhood’ as well) no longer 
operate as common standards: ‘A life of one’s own... is an experimental life, a 
probationary life’ (ibid: 164). Beck provides one framing of a more general 
debate about children’s rights and a democratisation of the family that we can 
see in wide ranging research across sociology and social theory. 
 
For example, in the late 1990s, research by Carol Smart and her colleagues 
paved the way for substantial re-conceptualisation of the family, specifically 
with regard to children after parental separation or divorce. Smart looked not 
only to the adults, but to the children as well.12 She argues that ‘[t]reating 
children as reflexive social actors is more than a theoretical perspective, for it 
raises questions about the whole tenor of child-adult relationships’ (Smart et 
al, 2001: 14). Importantly, the shift in conceptual and methodological thinking 
that Smart and her colleagues invoked was such that the family members 
could no longer be presumed to ‘think or feel the same way, or that their 
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interests and identities [could be] merged within an inseparable or tightly 
integrated unit’ (Smart et al, 2001: 18).  
In other words, this approach eschews the tendency towards children’s 
familialization... for it grants conceptual autonomy to individual family 
members. Within this formulation, then, children need no longer be 
invisible; they emerge as fully fledged family members, actively 
engaged in negotiating their own family practices and relationships. 
They no longer just belong to families; as reflexive agents of their own 
lives they are part of the creation of families. (Smart et al, 2001: 18) 
 
This perspective falls on the significance of the child’s voice and in this way 
the research of Smart and her colleagues is symptomatic of other research 
that pays attention to children, not simply as agents, but as speaking 
subjects.13 Although Smart and her colleagues are cautious about the relation 
between children’s voice and a political transformation of the family, social 
theorists, such as Anthony Giddens, have been less circumspect. Giddens 
states that ‘[t]he family is a basic institution of civil society’ (1998: 89), but he 
continues by declaring that: ‘The family is becoming democratized... 
Democratization in the context of the family implies equality, mutual respect, 
autonomy, decision-making through communication and freedom from 
violence’ (Giddens, 1998: 93). He constructs the democratic family as a policy 
ideal and objective. It is one which seeks to accommodate changes in family 
forms (such as, non-heterosexual families or ‘fragmented’ families), but also 
to recognise the importance of family in the stability of children’s lives (e.g. 
children are seen to grow up more psychologically secure, better able to 
achieve academic success, more confident in sexual and social relationships 
within the framework of constant non-conflictual co-parenting relations).14 The 
democratic family is one predicated on emotional and sexual equality, mutual 
rights and responsibilities, co-parenting, life-long parental contracts, 
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negotiated authority over children, obligations of children to parents and 
socially integration (Giddens, 1998: 95).15 
 
But these productive indistinctions regarding the democratic household are 
rooted in older social transformations. As Lasch argues, ‘a combination of 
philanthropists, educators, and social reformers’ began to side with ‘the 
weaker members of the family against patriarchal authority’, ‘children gained a 
certain independence from both parents, not only because other authorities 
asserted their jurisdiction over childhood but because parents lost confidence 
in the old rules of child-rearing and hesitated to assert their own claims in the 
face of professional expertise’ (1984: 185-6). Although we should be cautious 
of Lasch’s argument here, it certainly construes a democratisation of the 
family alongside an individualisation of family members. However, it does so, 
not in a manner of applause, but in a way that rightly construes the voice of 
the child, as it were, in the context of those who support and make possible 
that voice, namely, those ‘outside’ as well as ’inside’ the family. The 
problematisation of the household as a democratic space looks as if it is 
predicated on the transposition of a model of sovereignty from the domain of 
the state; and yet at the same time any patriarchal sovereignty within the 
household (inasmuch as the father is the despot) is undermined by a 
figuration of child with political voice, or rather with speech and not simply 
domesticated voice. Thus, the biopolitical figuration of children with speech 
(i.e. as organised voice) is a condition of new configurations of sovereignty.16 
As Agamben says, ‘[i]f anything characterizes modern democracy as opposed 
to classical democracy, then, it is that modern democracy presents itself from 
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the beginning as a vindication and liberation of zoē, and that it is constantly 
trying to transform its own bare life into a way of life and to find, so to speak, 
the bios of zoē’ (Agamben, 1998: 9). Contemporary sociology, then, is able to 
provide different accounts of how the bare life of the infant can be helped to 
speak through the support of others (not least those aligned with the authority 
of the state). In doing so, the ‘relations’ of both epistemology and sovereignty 
may appear to be in transformation. To speak as a child is not to usurp the 
authority and power of the father; political voice is not a matter of subtraction. 
To construct children as an experiential subject is to construct them with 
speech (i.e. to undo the claim that others have had of them in formation of 
dialogue – speech and counter-speech). Clearly the empirical implications of 
this are much more than this single essay can address. 
 
Conclusion 
There are, then, some significant issues to consider. 
 a) There are repeated motifs across Agamben’s work on infancy and 
experience and his work on biopolitical sovereignty. The dependence on a 
formulation of language as a systemic, purified and virtual relationality, such 
that actual speech is a necessary perversion is evident across both sets of 
writings. Although the reworking of a Kantian transcendental condition of 
possibility is different from the deployment of Aristotelian notions of potential 
and actual, the ‘formalism’ of Agamben’s argument in both cases provides us 
with little opportunity to meet the demand, that Agamben himself makes of us, 
to move beyond the historico-philosophical present.17 
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 b) The translation of this generative structural model across Agamben’s 
writing also facilitates the appearance of particular figures which have a 
‘structural’ similarity (in the sense that they constitute important figures in the 
discursive formation of Agamben’s writing). Of particular significance for us 
are the similar figurations of infancy and bare life. 
 c) But although Agamben has recourse to a structural model of 
language, we suggest that a model of discursive practice or semiotic 
relationality that foregrounds relations of contiguity is one that is able both to 
present the important concerns that are raised by Agamben, but also suggest 
a historico-sociological way forward. Understanding the relation between 
infancy and experience as a condition of existence, rather than condition of 
possibility, constitutes the problem as particular to a particular episteme that 
we have not surpassed. This is a sociological problem – regarding, in part, the 
distribution of communicative entitlements to children, the sites and conditions 
under which they may speak, and the authority with which such speech may 
be endowed – rather than a purely historico-philosophical one. 
 d) In this respect, contemporary sociological analysis that considers 
how infants and children might be given socio-political voice provides a way of 
reconfiguring Agamben’s insights into both infancy, voice, and biopolitical 
sovereignty. In such a framing, the warning of the solidarity between 
democracy and totalitarianism is read not as a historico-philosophical 
necessity, but as a problematisation to genealogically and sociologically 
deconstruct. 
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Endnotes 
                                            
1 For example, that we might see in Henri Lefebvre’s understanding of Baudelaire and 
Rimbaud (Lefebvre, 1992; see also Elden, 2006). We should also note that Agamben’s 
discussion of experience, and also some of his examples (such as the reference to the 
Symbolist poets) in this essay is heavily indebted to Walter Benjamin’s ‘The storyteller’ and 
‘The programme for the coming of philosophy’ (1973 and 1989). 
2 We should note that Baudelaire himself talks not simply of a lack of experience, but of the 
‘correspondence’ of senses and sensations:  
 As far-off echoes from a distance sound 
 In unity profound and recondite, 
 Boundless as night itself and as the light, 
 Sounds, fragrances and colours correspond. (Baudelaire, 1975: 43) 
It is also significant that Rimbaud talks of the disordering of the senses: ‘The poet makes 
himself a visionary through a long, a prodigious and rational disordering of all the senses’ 
(Rimbaud, 1957: xxx). It is only in doing so that the poet is able to make the leap and be 
destroyed by ‘those unnameable, unutterable and innumerable things’, namely, when the poet 
‘arrives at the unknown’ (ibid.: xxxi) 
3 I repeat the binary series langue/parole, semiotic/semantic, language/discourse, not in order 
to misconstrue the differences between Saussure and Benveniste, but because Agamben, 
despite referring to the difference between the two linguists, never properly differentiates 
between them and uses terms, such as langue and semiotic interchangeably, alongside ideas 
such as ‘pure language’. 
4 This is not to deny the many other influences on Agamben’s ideas about language (notably 
Benjamin’s notion of ‘pure language’), but for our reading of ‘Infancy and History’ Saussure 
and Benveniste are more significant (cf. Agamben, 1999). 
5 Matthew Calarco has discussed some of the problems in Agamben’s earlier work on the 
relation between human and animal and in his engagement with that problematic in his later 
work, such as The Open: Man and Animal (2004). Calarco particularly foregrounds the 
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problems of drawing on Heidegger and Benveniste in formulating an account of human 
subjectivity (Calarco, 2007). 
6 Agamben frames this problematic differently in The Open (2004). 
7 Of course, Benveniste has none of this and simply talks about ‘phonemes’ with respect to 
the semiotic and ‘words’ in the context of semantics. 
8 It is curious why in this later work the question of infancy is little to be found. And yet the 
infant constitutes an exemplary figure of bare life, representing both that which is within the 
household and (for example, in the figure of the abandoned child or even in the discourse of 
child socialisation) that which is external to the polis (see for example Agamben, 1998: 105). 
The infant (and mother and slave), both animal and human, is quintessentially the object of 
paternal power.  
9 We could add, following this logic, that there is politics because ‘man’ separates and 
opposes himself to infancy as that inclusive exclusion; namely, the polis is defined through a 
constitution of maturity, but where infancy is figured as the liminal and limit figure of 
experimentation and experience. But we are certainly wary of such a move in this essay. 
10 I do so not in the sense that there might be perceived an opposition between historico-
philosophical knowledge as abstract and formalistic and historico-sociological knowledge as 
concrete and substantive. 
11 Agamben says that: 
 Every attempt to rethink the political space of the West must begin with the clear  
 awareness that we no longer know anything of the classical distinction between zoē  
 and bios, between private life and political existence, between man as a simple living  
 being at home in the house and man’s political existence in the city. (1998: 187) 
But for Agamben the zone of indistinction is ultimately linked to ‘the camp’. We would certainly 
question, without denying its significance, such a reduction. The discourse of gender and 
feminism is remarkably absent in Agamben’s discussion. 
12 In doing so, she helped to put flesh on the legal structure set in place by the Children’s Act 
of 1989 in the UK that legally provided for children to have some kind of voice in matters that 
affect their lives. 
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13 For example, Jan Pryor and Robert E. Emery, in their research on children’s 
understandings of divorce in the US, declare that ‘[c]hildren are encouraged to be articulate, 
to express opinions on everything from bedroom décor to world events, and to be 
independent’. They state clearly a discourse on children’s political voice, namely that 
‘[f]amilies have become, by and large, democratic units allowing considerable participation by 
all members’ (Pryor and Emery, 2004: 171). 
14 For Giddens, these new family forms are symptomatic of the increasing importance of the 
self as a reflexive project, as one guided toward self-actualisation, as one formed through 
relationships of mutual self-disclosure and one formed through a concern for self-fulfilment 
(Giddens, 1991: 125). But also importantly these personal relationships and this formation of 
the self are constructed through relations at a distance. These are relations that are not 
predicated on the centrality of place, but on the disembedding of self and social relations from 
place and their stretching across space and time in abstract, mediated systems. What was 
once thought of as the hearth of the family – intimacy and community – are disembedded 
from their household location and distributed across space and time. Of course, modern 
communications help to facilitate such disembedding. Thus, where once we might have 
conflated family, home and household, we are now more circumspect about such prejudices. 
15 The difference between Smart et al’s and Giddens’ formulations here is clear: whereas 
Smart et al construe children’s voices as a form of independence from ‘the family’, Giddens 
seems to confine their voices within ‘the family’, albeit now reformed and democratic. The 
migration across or the security of the boundary between household and state is crucial here 
in understanding children’s voice and experiential being. 
16 It is surprising that Foucault, in his lectures on psychiatric power in 1973, talks about a 
system of sovereignty within the family (namely through the authority of the patriarch) in 
contrast to wider disciplinary shifts in society, but also in the sense that such familial 
sovereignty acts as the mechanism that links individual family members and the family as a 
whole to modern forms of governmentality (i.e. discipline) (Foucault, 2006: 80-7). This is 
surprising because it is precisely with the emergence of modern forms of the family in the 
nineteenth century that we begin to see the individualisation of family members, precisely as 
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constructed through forms of disciplinary power and knowledge. In this sense, then, we might 
construe any sovereignty of the family (namely, as a democratic unit, a discrete sovereign 
territory ruled by its people, the family members) as a simulacra maintained through the 
workings of government that holds individual family members (both adults and children) as 
accountable within the terms and conditions of contemporary and institutionalised forms of 
‘democracy’. Thus, the question is not whether the family is democratic, but who and in what 
context is the family, and importantly children, demanded to be democratic, to speak for 
themselves and to be held to account. Such an understanding, albeit not wanting to be critical 
of recent progressivist moves (hence unlike Lasch and Donzelot), would certainly wonder 
whether the demand for children to have a voice is an obligation within a relay of authorities 
out of their control and not necessarily in support of their interests. As Pryor and Emery state, 
‘children often do not want to make decisions about adult matters, even when they are deeply 
affected by them. In our zeal for recognizing the rights of children we may overinterpret their 
desire to have a voice in family matters’ (Pryor and Emery, 2004: 171). This implies having a 
high degree of sensitivity to children’s ‘voices’ that does not construct an obligation to be 
responsible. They argue that: 
 Children often seem to understand that responsibility is the corollary of rights. Young 
 children especially are clear that they do not want to be responsible for major 
 decisions at these times [of divorce]. It may be, then, that adults are well advised to 
 provide a scaffolding structure for children within which they are enabled to foster, 
 maintain, and abstain from relationships as far as possible... to create and maintain 
 an atmosphere... within which children can exercise agency in creating their own 
 relationship network and identity. (Pryor and Emery, 2004: 186). 
Contemporary forms of governmentality of families, then, needs not simply to address the 
parent as the relay of sovereignty, but to address individual family members, namely in our 
case children, in a manner that allows the interlocutor not only to speak, but also to stay 
silent, to have some control (whether actively or passively) over the conditions of 
communication and the relations of government. 
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17 As William E. Connolly argues ‘the formalism of his analysis disarms the most promising 
ways to negotiate it’ (2007: 28). 
